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Abstract
As costs of post-secondary education have risen and funding has decreased, institutions of higher
education have come to rely on educational loans to maintain their enrollment levels and programs. 1
Indeed, these institutions have become dependent upon federally financed educational loan programs for
their economic well being.2 Although the guaranteed loans are made by private lenders, the federal
government assumes liability if a student borrower dies, defaults, or seeks bankruptcy relief. 3 Because
the federal government guarantees repayment of these loans, their dischargeability in bankruptcy
proceedings affects all taxpayers. This paper offers an historical overview of the social milieu giving rise
to the general nondischargeability of educational loans in bankruptcy proceedings, sets forth a brief
legislative history of the section containing the general nondischargeability provision, and provides an
analysis of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent interpreting the general nondischargeability
provision.4
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I.

Introduction
As costs of post-secondary education have risen and funding has decreased,

institutions of higher education have come to rely on educational loans to maintain their
enrollment levels and programs. 1 Indeed, these institutions have become dependent upon
federally financed educational loan programs for their economic well being.2 Although the
guaranteed loans are made by private lenders, the federal government assumes liability if a
student borrower dies, defaults, or seeks bankruptcy relief. 3 Because the federal government
guarantees repayment of these loans, their dischargeability in bankruptcy proceedings affects
all taxpayers. This paper offers an historical overview of the social milieu giving rise to the
general nondischargeability of educational loans in bankruptcy proceedings, sets forth a brief
legislative history of the section containing the general nondischargeability provision, and
provides an analysis of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent interpreting the general
nondischargeability provision.4

II.

Overview

A.

BankruI!!£y Laws

The United States Constitution vests Congress with the authority "[t]o establish. . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."s
Congress exercised this authority by enacting the Bankruptcy Act.

In 1898,

Although suffering

several substantial amendments to the original enactment, the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
was and remains to "give[] to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.,,6 The Bankruptcy Act in its present form is codified as II USC §I 0 I, et seq.

~-

B.
During

Guaranteed Educational Loan Programs
the

twentieth

century,

a plexus

of congressional

enactments

and

administrative regulations created several educational incentive programs whereby students
seeking to pursue post-secondary education could avail themselves of public and private
funds to achieve those ends. These programs have been administered in a variety of forms,
including but not limited to:

.

Federal Work Study and institutional (non-subsidized) work study programs
Pell Grants and Supplemental Grants ('SEOGs"), which are awarded to lowincome undergraduate students based on their income and/or the income of
their parents
Low-interest loans for students available through the Federal Direct Student
Loan ("FDL") Program and the Federal Family Education Loan ("FFEL")
Program
Stafford Loans and low-interest Perkins loans, available to students with
exceptional financial need under the Federal Perkins Loan Program
Parent ("PLUS") Loans, available through the FDL and FFEL programs
Financial aid for health care students, such as Health Education Assistance
Loans ("HEAL") and National Health Service Corps ("NHSC") 7
The Iynchpin of these private loan programs consists of a guarantee arrangement by

which private lenders extend loans to students for post-secondary education purposes, with a
guarantee from the federal government that such loans will be repaid in the event of a
borrower's death, default, or insolvency. The federal government pays accruing interest on
subsidized loans while the student-debtor attends college or graduate school; however, the
debtor pays interest on unsubsidized loans which accrues while the debtor attends school. 8
III.

Historv of Bankruptcy Laws vis-a-vis Education Loan Proerams
The Bankruptcy Act did not at first concern itself with the dischargeability of student

loans. In 1970, however, Congress formed the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws (the
"1970 Commission"), consisting of a panel of jurists and scholars to reform the bankruptcy
laws.9 At that time, stories in the media recounted how individuals sought bankruptcy relief

2

to discharge student loans despite their prospects for substantial

future income.lo

"Concerned that the perception of abuse, however small in reality, would "discredit the
system and cause disrespect for the law and those charged with its administration," II the
1970 Commission presented a model bankruptcy code to Congress in 1973, which contained
a section barring student loans from discharge except in cases that would result in undue
hardship.I2 The 1970 Commission expressly acknowledged that very few student loans were
discharged in bankruptcy, citing an Office of Education study that had concluded that the
bankruptcy rate in the guaranteed student loan program was less than one-quarter of onepercent of all payable loans.13 While recognizing that "student loan abuse was more
perception than reality," 14the 1970 Commission nevertheless believed that the few cases
which involved abusive student loan debtors posed a threat to the continuation of the student
loan program by blemishing its image. IS Realizing that a drastic overhaul might prove too
burdensome for debtors in serious trouble, the 1970 Commission recommended an exception
to across-the-board nondischargeability: If the debtor could show that the student loans
caused undue hardship for the debtor and his dependents, those loans could be discharged. 16
Despite the 1970 Commission's position, student loans remained presumptively
dischargeable until 197617when Congress became concerned with a perceived high default
rate on guaranteed student loans. Although a 1976 General Accounting Office study reported
that less than one-percent of all matured educational loans were discharged in bankruptcy,
articles appeared in the press which created the impression that students habitually received
discharges of their loans.I8 Thus, in the 1976 Education Act Amendments,19 Congress
provided:
A debt which is a loan insured or guaranteed under the authority of this part
may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act only
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if such discharge is granted after the five-year period (exclusive of any
applicable suspension of the repayment period) beginning on the date of
commencement of the repayment period of such loan, except that prior to the
expiration of that five-year period, such loan may be released only if the court
in which the proceeding is pending determines that payment from future
income or other wealth will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or his
dependents.
See, 20 USC 1087-3 (1976).
Although the empirical evidence had indicated that the amount of money lost due to
student bankruptcy filings represented a very small percentage of the total outstanding loans,
Congress cited the perceived growing trend toward increased student loan bankruptcy filings
as the reason for the 1976 Education Act Amendments.2o
After the enactment of the 1976 Education Act Amendments, stories in the media
continued to tell of students discharging substantial student loan debt in bankruptcy while on
the brink of lucrative professional careers. Thus, in 1978 Congress acted once again and
codified the 1970 Commission's suggestion for a nondischargeability provision as section
523(a)(8) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act.2I As originally enacted on November 6,
1978, section 523(a)(8) read:
(a) A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt*

*

*

*

(8) for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in
part by a governmental unit or a non-profit institution of higher
education, unless(A) such loan first became due before five years (exclusive of
any applicable suspension of the repayment period) before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph
will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's
dependents(. ]
11 USC §523(a)(8) (1975).22
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Section 523(a)(8) represented a compromise between the House bill and the Senate
amendment regarding educational loans. Namely, it provided broader protection to creditors
under then-existing law, which was limited to federally insured loans, but applied only to
educational loans owing to a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of higher
education.23 By the plain language of this statute, a debtor could discharge student loans
even absent undue hardship if the loans had become due at least five years before filing for
bankruptcy relief. However, as further provided by section 523(a)(8), the five-year period
was tolled if the debtor requested a deferral of repayment. 24
In 1990, Pub L 101-647, §3621(1) amended section 523(a)(8) to increase the five
year nondischargeability period to seven years:
(a) A discharge under section 727,1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt *

*

*

*

(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless(A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment
first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable
suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph
will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's
dependents[.]

II use § 523(a)(8)(I 990).25
Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, a debtor could now discharge student
loans absent undue hardship if the loans had become due at least seven years before filing for
bankruptcy relief. As before, the seven-year period was tolled if the debtor requested a
deferral of repayment. 26
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Four years later, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 199427 created the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission (the "1994 Commission") and charged it with the
responsibility to prepare a report on issues in the Bankruptcy Code for submission to the
President, Congress, and the Chief Justice. On October 20, 1997, the 1994 Commission
submitted its final report, which acknowledged that "empirical evidence does not support the
oft-cited

allegation

that

changes

dischargeability, or otherwise

in bankruptcy

-- affect

law entitlements

--

exemptions,

the rate of filing for bankruptcy to obtain those

benefits.,,28 The report further pointed out that the undue hardship exception "is narrowly
construed such that the debtors most in need are least likely to be able to litigate the issue
convincingly or at all.,,29

Citing Arthur Ryman, Contract Obligation: A Discussion of

Morality, Bankruptcy, and Student Debt30 and Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in
Consumer BankruQ.!fy,31the 1994 Commission acknowledged the irony that "Congress
placed guaranteed loans in a class with debts for taxes, debts induced by fraud, and debts for
compensation of injuries by drunk drivers,'d2 such that Congress' enactment of section
523(a)(8) treated guaranteed educational loans "as more obligatory than other loans, defining
them to be as compelling as debts arising from turpitude.,,33

The report further

acknowledged that the guaranteed educational loan system had been "exploited by
proprietary schools, colleges, and universities, as well as by bankers and other lenders,
through contracts of adhesion that most students must accept lest they give up the idea of
learning.,,34 Thus, the report concluded that section 523(a)(8) should be repealed because
"[t]he bankruptcy system, through its network of exceptions to discharge, seems to penalize
individuals who seek to educate and improve themselves while it liberates other individuals
from overwhelming debt incurred for other purposes or through different means.,,35 The
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1994 Commission believed that repealing section 523(a)(8) would put an end to litigation
over the undue hardship exception "so that the discharge of student loans no longer would be
denied to those who need it most.,,36
Notwithstanding the 1994 Commission's recommendation that section 523(a)(8) be
repealed, on October 7, 1998, section 523(a)(8)(A) was amended to eliminate the seven-year
dischargeability provision and to establish student loans as generally nondischargeable in the
absence of undue hardship.37

Section 523(a)(8) has not been amended since the 1998

repealer, and in its current form reads:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt *

*

*

*

(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt
from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on
the debtor and the debtor's dependents
II USC §523(a)(8) (2005).
Three issues have predominated the litigation involving section 523(a)(8), namely:
What is an educational benefit, what institutions are covered, and what constitutes undue
hardship. This paper focuses on the latter issue, namely, what constitutes undue hardship for
purposes of discharging an educational loan under section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.
IV.

Undue Hardship: Analvsis of Sixth Circuit Precedent

A.

Procedural

Matters

Section 523(a)(8) is self-executing. 38 Thus, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4007 and
7001(6) an action to determine dischargeability of a debt must be brought as an adversary
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proceeding39 in which the debtor has the burden of proving that repayment of the educational
loans would impose an "undue hardship" under section 523(a)(8).40 When many of the
relevant facts, particularly those pertaining to the debtor's employment and income, are
stipulated by the parties, an adversary proceeding is unnecessary, and the issue of undue
hardship and dischargeability may be determined by way of a dispositive motion.41
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52, is applicable to adversary proceedings by
virtue of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.42 Rule 52(a) requires a bankruptcy
court hearing an adversary proceeding to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is
not necessary for the judge to prepare elaborate findings on every possible issue raised at
trial; however, "there must be findings, in such detail and exactness as the nature of the case
permits, of subsidiary facts on which an ultimate conclusion can rationally be predicated.,,43
"The findings should be explicit so as to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the
basis of the trial court's decision, and to enable it to determine the grounds on which the trial
court reached its decision.,,44
Before finding undue hardship and discharging an educational loan, a court must
consider the factors articulated by the Sixth Circuit as relevant when determining undue
hardship, else its decision will be reversed on appeal. 45 A determination that an educational
loan poses an undue hardship under section 523(a)(8) is a mixed question of law and fact.46
A lower court's conclusions of law are subject to de novo review, i.e., a reviewing court
decides the issue as if it had not been heard before with no deference being given to the trial
court's conclusions of law.47 A lower court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard, i.e., a reviewing court determines whether it is "left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." 48
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B.

The "Undue Hardshig" Standard

A court may not discharge an educational loan unless a debtor satisfies the undue
hardship standard set forth in section 523(a)(8) to discharge an educational loan.49 What
constitutes undue hardship for purposes of section 523(a)(8) has been one of the most widely
litigated issues.

The undue hardship exception has proved difficult to apply because

Congress did not see fit to define the term in its various enactments, leaving the
determination to be made by the bankruptcy courts on a case-by-case basis after considering
a debtor's circumstances.

In an effort to construe this provision, bankruptcy courts drew

upon the legislative history of section 523(a)(8)50 and "compensated for lack of a definition
by devising tests to measure undue hardship.,,51 Three such tests quickly shaped the nascent
judicial landscape: Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority v Johnson (In re
Johnson},52 Bryant v Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (In re Bryant),53
and Brunner v New York State Higher Education Services Corporation. 54
For many years, the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt anyone test, but it frequently
looked for guidance from the test enunciated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Brunner v New York State Higher Education Services Corporation, 55 commonly known as
the "Brunner test." On February 3, 2005, however, the Court expressly adopted the Brunner
test as the test to be applied in the Sixth Circuit when determining whether educational loan
debt presents an undue hardship on a debtor. 56 This test requires a court to determine that: I)
based on current income and expenses, the debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of
living for himself and his dependents if forced to repay the loans, 2) additional circumstances
exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the
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repayment period of the student loans, and 3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay
the loans. 57

c.

Inabilitv to Maintain Minimal Standard of Livin1!

The first prong of the Brunner test requires a court to determine whether, based on
current income and expenses, a debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living for
himself and his dependents if forced to repay the loans. 58 "Where a family earns a modest
income and the family budget, which shows no unnecessary or frivolous expenditures, is still
unbalanced, a hardship exists from which a debtor may be discharged of his student loan
obligations.,,59 Under this prong, a "bankruptcy court must ascertain what amount is
minimally necessary to ensure that the dependents' needs for care, including food, shelter,
clothing, and medical treatment are met.,,60 When assessing a debtor's finances for purposes
of discharging educational loans, the Sixth Circuit on one hand professes to "stop short of
,,61
utter hope Iessness.

On the other hand, however, the Court maintains that "the

dischargeability of student loans should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not
simply a present inability to fulfill financial commitment.,,62 In either case, a debtor should
not be made "a slave to the loans" or otherwise be deprived "of any future hope for financial
independence. ,,63

When making determinations regarding this factor, the Sixth Circuit has considered
the debtor's monthly expenses, both standing alone and in contrast with the debtor's monthly
income, and the debtor's annual income in relation to the Poverty Guidelines. To be sure, in
Cheesman v Tenn Student Assistance Corp (In re Cheesman),64 one of the Sixth Circuit's
most seminal decisions on the issue of undue hardship, the husband and wife debtors sought
a discharge of approximately $30,000 in outstanding debts, of which $14,267 was
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attributable to guaranteed student loans. The debtors' gross income was $15,676, leaving
them a net income of $13,720.

They provided the court with an expense chart listing

monthly expenses that totaled $1,594. Included in this chart was a $100 monthly tuition
expense to send one of their two children to a private school because the debtors found the
threat of corporal punishment posed by public schooling unacceptable.

The couple's

daughter had asthma and required medical treatment which further accounted for $140 in
medical fees listed on the expense chart. Although the couple's health insurance was paid by
his employer, the family nevertheless incurred various expenses related to their daughter's
asthma condition because of their high deductible. The debtors owned a 1988 Chevrolet
Nova, worth approximately $3,000, on which they owed $7,081 and paid in monthly
payments of $350.65
Although the lower court did not state which test it had used to determine that the
loans imposed an undue hardship, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the loans were
dischargeable under any undue hardship test the court may have used in reaching its
decision.,,66 That panel reasoned that
there was no indication that the debtors were capable of paying the loans
while maintaining a minimal standard of living. The debtors' 1992 gross
income of $15,676 exceeded by only a slim margin the government's 1992
poverty income guideline of $13,950 for a family of four. The expense chart
presented by the Cheesmans demonstrated that they maintained a frugal
lifestyle consistent with their low income. Despite this fact, the Cheesmans
had a monthly deficit of approximately $400. Under these circumstances, we
are satisfied that the Cheesmans could not maintain a minimal standard of
living for their family if they were required to repay their loans.67
As indicated in its holding, the Cheesman Court considered the Poverty Guidelines in
conjunction with a comparative analysis of the debtor's income and expenses.
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In Tenn Student Assistance CorQ v Hornsby (In re Hornsby)68 the husband and wife
debtors, who had three small children, sought to discharge educational loans that totaled
$33,387.67 at the time of the dischargeability proceeding.

The couple had $2,556.66 in

disposable monthly income and $2,364.90 in monthly expenses, leaving them an operating
monthly surplus of $191.76 to $280.43, depending on whether the husband earned overtime
for a particular month.69 The loan guarantor argued that the debtors had not "tighten( ed]
their belts" inasmuch as 1) the couple had recently purchased a newer used automobile,
which had resulted in an increase in their automobile repair expenses; 2) the couple had
moved from Tennessee to Texas, thereby increasing their monthly rental expense by $200; 3)
the couple had "relatively high bills for telephone use, electricity, meals eaten out, and
cigarettes"; and 4) the couple's income well exceeded the standard for a family of five
established in the Poverty Guidelines, since their projected income would exceed $36,000
while the Poverty Guidelines for a family of five was only $17,710.70 The lower court found
that I) although the car expenditure might have been ill-advised, the couple had purchased
the car with a good-faith belief that it would decrease their expenses, and 2) the couple's
move to Texas had been necessitated by a need for greater job security for the parties.
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court concluded that the debtors were not capable of paying
their student loans and maintaining a minimal standard of living and granted them a hardship
discharge. The court did not address the issue regarding the couple's bills for telephone use,
electricity, meals eaten out, and cigarettes. 71

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that although the lower court
had "purported to apply the Brunner test of undue hardship, it did not engage in the
meaningful inquiry required to evaluate either the Hornsbys' expenses or the extent to which
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their discretionary income could be applied to their student loans."n

The Court concluded

that "[t]he bankruptcy court's analysis simply was not thorough enough to support a finding
of undue hardship.,,73 The Circuit further explained:
While the Hornsby family income may be modest, the Hornsby family budget
is not unbalanced. The Hornsbys operate with a surplus of approximately
$200 per month, and their income puts them significantly above the poverty
guideline for a family of five. The Hornsbys further do not seem to have
minimized expenses in every way possible. The bankruptcy court did not
question what seem like an exorbitant bill for long distance telephone service
or the Hornsbys' monthly bill of $100 for cigarettes.74
Based upon these facts, the appellate panel concluded that "[t]he Hornsbys' financial
circumstances and management of their debts do not meet any test of undue hardship such to
justify discharge of their student loan obligations.,,75
In DeMatteis v Case W Reserv_eUniv (In re DeMatteis),76 the debtor's educational
loan debt totaled $110,469.38 and her monthly loan payment was approximately $630 at the
time she filed her bankruptcy petition. The debtor had taken a job as an office manager in a
chiropractic office for which her net monthly income was $1,034. The debtor did not suffer
from any physical, emotional or mental condition that prevented her from obtaining
employment. The debtor was single and had no children, lived at home with her parents, and
drove her father's car to work. After analyzing her budget, the bankruptcy court found that
the debtor's monthly income exceeded her expenses by at least $200 and also found that
some of her expenses "appear[ ed] higher than we customarily see for a person in her
circumstances.

. . indicat[ing that] Plaintiff would be able to devote at least some of her

income toward repayment of the loans without suffering a substantial decline in her standard
of living." The bankruptcy court found this "a very close case," but notwithstanding it's
ruling that the debtor would be "unable to payoff her loans entirely, even if she enters into a
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thirty (30) year repayment plan," it determined that the debtor had not established undue
hardship.77 Despite the absence of any demonstrable undue hardship, the court exercised its
equitable powers and fixed the debtor's educational loan debt payment at $200 per month for
ten years, effectively discharging $86,469.38 of the debtor's $110,469.38 loan debt.78
In Dolph v Penn Higher Ed Assist Agency (In re Dolph), 79the debtor successfully
established undue hardship by showing that at the time of the adversary proceeding his
monthly household expenses exceeded his monthly household income by approximately
$500. The debtor further established that he had no substantial assets to sell in order to repay
the loan. Both the debtor and his wife testified that the only portion of their budget that
could possibly be adjusted was the amount allocated to food. On the facts of this case, the
Sixth Circuit did not hesitate to find that the debtor had sufficiently established that he was
unable to repay the loans while maintaining a minimal standard ofliving.80
In Rice v United States (In re Rice)81 the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court's
refusal to discharge the debtor's educational loans, noting that repayment would not reduce
the debtor's standard of living to below or near the poverty level as determined by the
Poverty Guidelines. The Court also made particular note of the fact that the debtor's children
were presumably attending private schools and that the family claimed expenses for
"Recreation/vacations." 82 The Rice Court also took special note of the fact the debtors'
claimed expenses had, "without apparent reasonable justification, undergone a 'disturbing'
increase over a short period.,,83
Taking the Court's rulings on this criterion as a whole, a general rule evolves
whereby the Sixth Circuit is apt to find undue hardship when a debtor's gross income is at or
near the Poverty Guidelines and, despite a frugal lifestyle, his expenses exceed his income.
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D.

Likelihood that State of Affairs Will Persist

The second prong of the Brunner test requires a court to determine whether additional
circumstances exist which indicate that the present financial state of affairs is likely to persist
for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans.84 Such circumstances
must be indicative of a "certainty of hopelessness, not merely a present inability to fulfill
financial commitment.,,85 "They may include illness, disability, a lack of useable job skills,
or the existence of a large number of dependents.,,86 "And, most importantly, they must be
beyond the debtor's control, not borne of free choice.,,87 "Choosing a low-paying job cannot
merit undue hardship relief.,,88 Although the Court has acknowledged that determining
future persistence of present factors is "necessarily speculative," this fact "does not relieve
the debtor of the burden of proving that he will be obstructed from earning a living in the
future. ,,89

The Court has typically employed two factors when determining this issue: the
debtor's physical and mental faculties and the likelihood of the debtor's prospective gainful
employment. The Court has not attached much reasoning to its consideration of a debtor's
physical and mental faculties. For example, in Tenn Student Assistance Corp v Hornsby (In
re Hornsby),90 the bankruptcy court had found that the debtors' earning capacity was likely
to remain relatively constant for many years, despite the fact that current day-care expenses
might dissipate over time, because any additional money saved from the day-care expenses
would be insignificant. Rather than focus on the amount of income by which the debtors
would be increased once relieved of the day-care expenses, the Sixth Circuit reversed,
summarily concluding that the debtors "are 'young as well as healthy, and in all likelihood
[their] income will increase in the future.',,91 Other panels of the Court have similarly ruled
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that debtors who are "intelligent and well-spoken, albeit underemployed" fail to establish that
their state of affairs would likely persist for a significant portion of the repayment period.92
Presumably, the Court assumes that a debtor who is healthy, intelligent, and articulate will be
able to remedy his financial plight in an amount of time which is less than a significant
portion of the repayment period of the student loans.
Although the Court has been relatively more articulate when deciding the likelihood
of a debtor's prospective gainful employment, this criterion has also proven difficult to
implement. For instance, in Cheesman v Tenn Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman),93
the husband debtor testified that he hoped to receive a promotion within the near future, and
the wife debtor was receiving unemployment benefits, actively seeking employment, and had
been placed on the Board of Education's preferred hiring list.

Upon affirming the

bankruptcy court's finding of undue hardship, the Sixth Circuit reasoned:
Second, there was no indication that the debtors' financial situation would
improve in the foreseeable future. True, Dallas testified that he was hoping
for a promotion at his current job, and Margaret testified that she was actively
seeking employment. There is no assurance, however, that either will obtain
their objectives. Moreover, Margaret's employment history does not indicate
that the Cheesmans' financial condition would improve considerably if she
obtained a position as a teacher's aide.
At best, she worked only
intermittently as a teacher's aide. She received only minimal wages before
her position was eliminated. Also, the court properly considered the fact that
Margaret's unemployment compensation would run out within two weeks of
the hearing and that this would burden further the Cheesmans' financial
situation.94
Judge Guy dissented, finding that the debtors had not established that current
circumstances would prevent their financial condition from improving in the future or that
they had acted in good faith:
The Cheesmans are not disabled. They are not ill. They are not elderly. They
are both college trained. At the time of the bankruptcy hearing, Mr.
Cheesman held a job, and he testified that there was the possibility of a
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promotion with his current employer. Mrs. Cheesman is qualified to tutor or
substitute teach, as she did prior to the filing of the Chapter 7 petition. These
circumstances are inapposite of those in cases in which a court has found
"additional circumstances" to exist.95
Relying upon Cheesman, the Court has subsequently clarified that an "effective job
search" need not equate to a "successful job search.,,96 [n Dolph v Penn Higher Ed Assist
Agency (In re Dolph), 97the bankruptcy court heard considerable evidence about the debtor's
efforts to obtain employment. The debtor testified that he had sent out approximately 200
resumes before obtaining his current employment with a car rental agency. The court also
heard testimony from the loan guarantor's expert witness that the debtor had not conducted
an effective job search. The Dolph Court explained:
It should be noted that, throughout the trial proceedings and during this
appeal, both parties frequently used the phrase "effective job search,"
apparently to mean "successful job search," i.e., a job search that resulted in
employment or higher paying employment. Cheesman does not require the
Debtor to conduct such a job search. In Cheesman, the debtors' job search did
not result in higher paying employment; nevertheless, the court of appeals
sustained the bankruptcy court's discharge of their student loans. The
debtor's job search and the results of such a search, however characterized,
are simply factors, among all other relevant factors, that the bankruptcy court
would consider in applying the second part of the Cheesman test. 98
In Oyler v Educational Credit Management Corp (In re Oyler),99 the lower court
granted the debtor, a 48-year-old married pastor with three children and leader of a Messianic
Jewish congregation, a hardship discharge of approximately $40,000 in educational loans.
Before founding his church, the debtor had earned bachelors and master's degrees, worked as
a salesman and audio engineer, and once owned his own business. At the time of trial, the
debtor's family income had been less than $10,000 for each of the preceding two years -well below the Poverty Guidelines for a family of five. The church congregation provided
the family with an apartment and a salary around $1,200 per month, which varied depending
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on the congregation members' contributions. The family had no health insurance, and the
debtor suffered four retinal detachments as a result of a medical condition. The only debts
which the debtor sough to discharge were his educational loan debts.
To establish that circumstances existed which indicated that the debtor's present
financial state of affairs were likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period of the student loans, the debtor testified that he was completely committed to his
calling as a minister in his Messianic Jewish congregation and that his circumstances would
be likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Additionally, two pastors testified that the
debtor was committed to his calling and that his circumstances were unlikely to change. The
lower court granted the debtor a hardship discharge of $38,978.20 in educational loans. The
guarantor appealed on the grounds that the debtor's circumstances were not likely to persist
for the foreseeable future because the bankruptcy court refused to consider that the debtor
could have simply obtained a higher paying job either with a different congregation or in
another field. The Sixth Circuit agreed, and held that the debtor had failed to satisfy the
second prong of the Brunner test because he had "shown no 'additional circumstances. . .
indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period.'" 100

Oyler's choice to work as a pastor of a small start-up church cannot excuse his
failure to supplement his income so that he can meet knowingly and
voluntarily incurred financial obligations. By education and experience he
qualifies for higher-paying work and is obliged to seek work that would allow
debt repayment before he can claim undue hardship. See In re Storey, 312 BR
at 872 (debtor must do everything in his power to improve financial situation);
In re Kraft, 161 BR at 86-87 (debtor needed to look for all job opportunities
before claiming undue hardship). The Bankruptcy Court erred by not
considering that Oyler's decision not to maximize his earnings, though
commendable, was voluntarily made after he also voluntarily incurred the
debt that he now wishes to discharge. 101
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Thus, according to Oyler a debtor may not voluntarily decrease his likelihood of
obtaining prospective gainful employment then seek a discharge as an undue hardship based
upon his voluntary decision.
It is imperative that a bankruptcy court's factual findings be clear regarding a debtor's
likelihood of prospective gainful employment. In Dolph v Penn Higher Ed Assist Agency
(In re Dolph),102 the lower court found that "[a] lack of skill at obtaining optimum
employment does not require that [Dolph] be penalized with a finding of nondischargeability
where other factors suggest the contrary result. All in all, it appears [Dolph] has made honest,
albeit inept, efforts to find better employment." 103 The Sixth Circuit noted that while the
debtor's efforts associated with his job search could be a component of the debtor's good
faith efforts to repay the loans, the propriety of a debtor's job search is more relevant to
determining whether additional circumstances exist which indicate that the debtor's financial
situation is likely to persist. Because the appellate court in Dolph was unclear to what extent
and under what branch of the Brunner test the bankruptcy court had considered the debtor's
job search efforts, it vacated the lower court's ruling and remanded the case for further
factual findings. 104

Similarly, the lower court in Dolph found that the debtor would not be

able to make any payments on the loan in the reasonably foreseeable future without
substantial hardship to his family and that the debtor did not have, nor would he have in the
reasonably foreseeable future, sufficient saleable assets or disposable income which could be
applied toward repayment of the loans, absent sacrifice to the immediate needs of his family.
Thus, the bankruptcy court concluded that "[t]he question of what [Dolph's] future holds in
store for him

--be it a new and better job or be it a promotion

with his present employer -- is

unknown, and any immediate evaluation of the likelihood for positive change in [Dolph's]
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present or future financial circumstances is speculative and not a firm basis for the Court to
reach a decision." 105 The Sixth Circuit found the bankruptcy court's findings ambiguous
and inadequate to support the conclusion that the debtor had satisfied his burden to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that additional circumstances exist which would make it
likely that his current inability to repay the educational loans would persist. Accordingly, the
appellate court remanded for clarification of the bankruptcy court's findings. 106

E.

Bona Fide Efforts to R~lli!YLoans

The last prong of the Brunner test requires that the debtor make good faith efforts to
repay the loans. to? The Sixth Circuit's decisions on this point are clear: Hardship discharges
will be denied absent a showing of at least a minimal good faith effort to repay the
educational loans. In making this determination, the Court has looked not only to the number
and amount of loan payments but also to the timing of the loan payments in relation to the
timing of the bankruptcy petition seeking discharge of the educational loans.
For example, in Tenn Student Assistance Corp v Hornsby (In re Hornsby),108 the
bankruptcy court had found in a conclusory fashion that the husband and wife debtors had
exhibited good faith efforts in managing their student loans, despite the fact that they had
failed to make even a single payment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the lower court's
ruling unsupported

by the evidence. 109

Thereafter, in Miller v Penn Higher Ed Assist Agency (In re Miller),llo the Sixth
Circuit held that the debtor had failed to show that she had made good faith efforts to repay
the loans "because in the five years since she had left school, she had contributed only $368
towards repayment of her student loans, which totaled almost $90,000, while using such
'non-essentials'

as personal internet service, long distance telephone service, cell phone
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service, and cable television." III Thus, the Miller court considered the amount of the loan
repayment as well as the amount of the payment in contrast to the debtor's expenditures for
other items.
In Rice v United State (In re Rice) 112the Court refused to grant a hardship discharge,
noting that the outstanding educational loan debt was largely the debtor's own doing because
of his minimal repayments

-- some made

involuntarily through garnishment proceedings -

and that these payments reflected little effort on his part to satisfy the original obligation.
This factor weighed particularly heavy against discharge in light of the complete absence of
any evidence that dire financial circumstances prevented the debtor from making a larger
.

h
Impact on tee

d bt. 113

Not only have courts considered debtors' efforts at repayment of their educational
loans, they have also considered the timing of loan payments in relation to the timing of the
petition seeking bankruptcy relief. Thus, in Cheesman v Tenn Student Assistance Corp (In
re Cheesman},114 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding of undue
hardship, noting:
Third, there was no evidence that the Cheesmans did not act in good faith.
This is not a case where the petitioner seeks discharge within a month of loans
becoming due. The Cheesmans made minimal payments on their loans
several years after their loans became due and at least a year before filing for
bankruptcy. Furthermore, the Cheesmans chose to work in worthwhile, albeit
low-paying, professions. There is no indication that they were attempting to
abuse the student loan system by having their loans forgiven before
embarking on lucrative careers in the private sector. In light of these
considerations, we hold that the Cheesmans' student loans imposed an undue
hardship.

I15

Again, Judge Guy dissented, finding that the debtors had not established that they had
acted in good faith since, during the six-year period after the loans first became due and
owing, the debtors had made only two $50 payments on each of their loans. There also was
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no evidence that the debtors sought the less drastic remedy of a deferment of payments on
their debts before attempting to discharge them. 116
A bankruptcy court's failure to make sufficient findings regarding a debtor's good
faith efforts, or lack thereof, to repay the educational loans is fatally defective. In Dolph v
Penn Higher Ed Assist Agency (In re Dolph), 117although the debtor had made 21 payments
owed on his educational loans and had not sought a discharge shortly after his loans became
due, the Sixth Circuit remanded "for the required findings" because the lower court record
was "silent concerning the issue of good faith." 118
The Sixth Circuit has also noted that an unbalanced ratio of educational loan debt to
the other debts set forth in the bankruptcy petition may be suggestive of a bad faith intent to
merely discharge educational

VI.

loan debt. I19

Conclusion
Over the course of the last thirty years, Congress has found the notion of a "fresh

start" for debtors seeking to discharge educational loans in bankruptcy proceedings
outweighed by a purported effort to maintain the integrity of federally-guaranteed
educational loan programs.

In the complete absence of any defining criteria, courts have

struggled with the task of determining when the failure to discharge educational loans would
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and his dependents. The lack of uniformity amongst
Sixth Circuit decisions is perhaps symptomatic of the Court's internal struggle between
wanting to advance the values of a post-secondary education while not subjecting
government-sponsored loan guarantee programs to undue abuse by the less scrupulous. The
Sixth Circuit may have put it best when it declared: "It is clear that Congress intended to
make discharge of a student loan more difficult to discharge than other types of debt,
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although

not impossible.,,120

This attempt to make hardship discharges difficult, yet

possible, has succeeded inasmuch as "nondischargeability has become the broad rule with
only a narrowly construed undue hardship discharge.,,121 Thus, Congress has apparently
triumphed in its effort to exalt the fiscal integrity of government programs over the notion of
a "fresh start" for debtors burdened with educational loan debt.
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